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We develop an explanation of the emergence of local norms, and the associated phenom-
enon of geographical variation in behavior. Individuals are assumed to interact locally
with neighbors in an environment with a network externality. Although many patterns
of behavior are possible, the dispersed interactive choices of agents are shown to select
behavior that is locally uniform but globally diverse. The range of applications of the
theory includes regional variation in the practice of medicine, technology choice, and
corruption. The framework is also useful for further developing our understanding of
important phenomena like lock-in, critical thresholds, and contagion.1 Introduction
Geographical variations in behavior are a persistent puzzle. People in seemingly similar
situations often choose to do di®erent things. Their choices depend upon where they
live and the people they associate with. These circumstances give rise to uniformity of
behavior within groups, together with global diversity across groups. Such di®erences are
attributed, almost axiomatically, to di®erences in \culture" or \norms," as in matters of
dress, speech, or driving, for example. For our purposes the term \norm" refers to an
established behavior that is widespread, if not universal, within a particular community.
It is also self-reinforcing: once the norm is in place it is in each individual's interest to
conform to it, even though ex ante an alternative norm might have emerged.1 In a given
region, or within a given social group, there is the appearance of a socially agreed upon
way of responding to situations. Across groups, however, di®erences in behavior persist
even when the groups are not isolated. The challenge is to understand how such locally
uniform, globally diverse, patterns emerge. To paraphrase Morris (2000), we want to
know when and why we might expect \coexistent conventions."
Geographical variation in norms is pervasive. For example, the medical treatment
that a patient receives depends, to an inordinate extent, on where he lives. Geographi-
cal variations in medical procedure choice were ¯rst documented by Glover (1938), and
subsequent studies (e.g. Wennberg and Gittelsohn 1973, Wennberg and Cooper 1999)
have con¯rmed the presence of \small area variations." Furthermore, choices appear rel-
atively uniform at the local level (Burke, Fournier, and Prasad, 2004, hereafter BFP). In
sharecropping, contracts between tenants and landlords often take a simple form where
the tenant keeps a ¯xed fraction of the produce. Studies have shown that the speci¯c
fraction (e.g. half or two-thirds) tends to be uniform within regions, but can vary consid-
1In this de¯nition a norm is the same thing as a convention, as de¯ned in Young (1993), and we will
use the terms interchangeably.
1erably across regions (Young and Burke, 2001; Burke and Young, 2003). The competition
between alternative standards in technology (Arthur, 1989; David, 1985) is another ex-
ample. Locally uniform convergence to a standard often arises, together with di®erences
in choices by di®erent groups. Likewise, there is considerable evidence of di®erences
in norms of corruption of government o±cials across regions with similar governance
structures, of courtesy and helpfulness towards strangers, and the industriousness and
entrepreneurship of workers. Numerous studies of organizations have indicated how the
success of work groups depends on \corporate culture" or \social capital" (e.g. Nahapiet
and Ghosal (1998), Adler and Kwon (2002), Hermalin (1999), Knack and Keefer (1997)).
Otherwise similar groups are capable of very di®erent levels of performance based on
a shared expectation of individual contributions to the group. Inter-organization rela-
tionships are another possible source of regional uniformity, as in Krugman(1991), Uzzi
(1997), and Owen-Smith and Powell (2004). While uniform behavior within groups has
been the subject of numerous inquiries stressing social in°uences on behavior, relatively
little theoretical research in economics (we cite some examples below) has addressed
the puzzle of geographical variation: why and when do di®erent groups adopt di®erent
norms?2
In this paper we examine a variety of regional variation phenomena using a model
that incorporates local interaction within networks and social in°uence on choices. We
build upon much previous work, but especially the recent literature on evolutionary
game theory (e.g. Young, 1998; Ellison, 1993). Rather than deducing equilibrium behav-
ior from game-theoretic solution concepts predicated on strong rationality assumptions,
these models describe the aggregate behavioral patterns that emerge when individuals
adopt relatively simple, boundedly rational decision rules. Predictions focus on the sta-
2While numerous works (e.g. Kremer 1993, Selod and Zenou 2001) have pointed to the presence of
multiple equilibria to explain geographic variation, the latent existence of multiple equilibria does not
explain the simultaneous selection of di®erent equilibria at di®erent, possibly contiguous, locations.
2ble, long-run behavior of the dynamics, which depend not only on the behavioral rules
but also on the topology of the social interactions. Within this literature we follow most
closely those papers that address the prospects for behavioral uniformity (and diversity)
under various social maps and payo® structures, such as Morris (2000), Goyal (1996),
and Sugden (1996). The most direct in°uence is the Young and Burke (2001) model
of the evolution of sharecropping norms. Unlike the latter paper, however, the current
framework does not rely on a speci¯c parametrization of payo®s, and admits a broader
range of interpretations. In this more general setting analytical results are not forthcom-
ing, and we rely on a computational approach.3 Fortunately, the results are remarkably
sharp.
Our model has a network of agents with a de¯ned neighborhood relation.4 A central
assumption is that choices of neighbors exert a direct social in°uence on an agent's
decision. A particular choice yields a greater payo®, and so becomes more likely, if
more neighbors have recently made the same choice. Decisions are myopic and error-
prone. Agents take the current choices of neighbors as given and, in each period, try
to choose an optimal response. However, with small probability they make the wrong
choice. As this stochastic dynamic process evolves in time, we are able to witness the
emergence of the characteristic pattern of locally uniform and globally diverse choices.
As parameters of the model are varied, we also observe the presence of critical points
that, when crossed, lead to a sudden qualitative change in the behavior of the system.
As a result, norms within a region tend not to change gradually and, instead, respond
suddenly as important thresholds are crossed. In the absence of errors the network could
3A computational approach to problems such as these is taken by Epstein and Axtell (1996) and
Epstein (2001).
4The nature of social interactions in this model is admittedly simple, but nonetheless enables sharp
and robust results. For example we assume a ¯xed exogenous neighborhood structure. We discuss
possible extensions for future research, such as endogenous network formation, in the conclusion.
3get locked into a number of possible norms. Errors, even when they are small, allow us
to re¯ne our predictions considerably.
The local uniformity is clearly a consequence of the local social in°uence (or network
externality) assumption. While network externality models can generate behavioral uni-
formity, they tend to do so on a global scale. We want to get diversity without resorting
to the untenable assumption that groups are isolated. Global diversity arises from the
assumed heterogeneity in the environment, where heterogeneity occurs within as well as
across regions. Global diversity can arise also in models with homogeneous agents, as in
Morris (2000), Sugden (1996), and Goyal (1996), among others. The extension to the
heterogeneous case is non-trivial, and we are motivated by the richness of the applications
that are a®orded in such settings. For example, in the Young and Burke (2001) model,
regions di®er in soil quality. One region may have more fertile soil on average, although
all regions have both high and low quality plots. Some contracts are more ideally suited
to high quality plots, others to low quality plots. In the presence of local social in°uence,
the contract chosen for a low quality plot is likely to depend upon the average soil quality
in the region. In any region the landlord and tenant of the low quality plot will be drawn
towards the contract others choose, and in fertile regions this is likely to be the contract
appropriate for high quality plots. A similar idea appears in the BFP model of medical
procedure choice. The ideal procedure for a patient depends upon individual character-
istics, such as age, which vary within the population. Physicians are also in°uenced by
the choices of neighboring physicians. Locally uniform treatment will result, where the
local norm depends on the typical patient characteristics in the region. For instance, in
regions where older people are relatively more numerous the norm that emerges is for
the use of procedures better suited for older patients, even on younger patients. In each
case, an identical transaction (between identical landlords and tenants on identical plots,
or identical physicians and patients) will result in very di®erent outcomes at di®erent
4locations. The predicted relationship between average regional characteristics and local
norms holds up rather well in data sets on sharecropping in Illinois (Young and Burke,
2001) and cardiac care in Florida (BFP).
The environment we present here extends BFP's ¯nding of robust geographical vari-
ation and generalizes it to other applications. In BFP, stable long-run variation requires
an in¯nite geography in which physicians are assumed to be located on the integers Z,
and their neighbors are the adjacent physicians. Here we obtain regional variation for
a ¯nite number of agents and for a larger set of spatial arrangements. Moreover, errors
in decision-making are shown to be crucial for producing regional variation in the ¯nite
case. When regional variation is a stable outcome of the noiseless process the noisy dy-
namic process approximates exactly this equilibrium (leading us to believe that regional
variation is stable in the sense of Kandori, Mailath and Rob (1993) and Young (1993)).
Remarkably, even when regional variation cannot be a long-run outcome we ¯nd that it
arises as a robust phenomenon for considerable lengths of time.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We describe the general model in
section 2, and present the results from our simulations in section 3. Finally, we draw
together our conclusions in section 4, emphasizing what we learn about the emergence of
norms, and discussing the key phenomena observed|regional variation, criticality, and
lock-in.
2 Model
There are M agents or decision makers. Each agent x has a set of neighbors, N(x). We
consider two arrangements of the agents (called geographies): (i) a circle, and (ii) a torus.
The circle has the virtue of simplicity, while still capturing the notion of local, overlapping
interactions. While any individual is in°uenced only by the actions of two neighboring
agents, the behavior of others much farther away may exert an indirect in°uence. At the
5same time we are interested in more complex interaction structures because results on
the circle may not be robust. The torus model gives each agent 4 rather than 2 neighbors,
and a®ects the behavior at the boundaries between regions, as described below. We ¯nd
that regional variation may arise and persist in both types of graphs, but the di®erences
between the cases indicate that network size is important. In the circle, we index the M
agents by the numbers 1;2;:::;M and de¯ne the neighborhoods by
N(i) =
8
> > > <
> > > :
f2;Mg if i = 1
f1;M ¡ 1g if i = M
fi ¡ 1;i + 1g if M > i > 1
In e®ect, agents are located along a single dimension, with the neighbors being those at
adjacent locations. However, we de¯ne 1 and M to be neighbors. In the torus geography,
we do the same with a two dimensional arrangement. Suppose that each location is
identi¯ed by two coordinates (i;j). We assume that 1 · i · K and 1 · j · K, together
with M = K2. Now the neighbors of (i;j) are f(i + 1;j);(i ¡ 1;j);(i;j + 1);(i;j ¡ 1)g,
with the obvious modi¯cation at the boundaries.
At each date, each agent observes a private signal ¾i 2 f®;¯g and chooses a decision
di 2 fA;Bg. Payo®s depend upon (di;¾i), as well as on the decisions of neighbors.5 Let
n be the number of neighbors of agent i who chose action A in the previous period; we
denote payo®s by ¼(di;¾i;n). De¯ne the payo® di®erence ¢¾(n) = ¼(A;¾;n)¡¼(B;¾;n).
Our key social in°uence or network externality assumption is as follows:
Assumption 1: ¢¾(n) is an increasing function of n for all ¾.
In other words, A becomes relatively more attractive if more neighbors decided to play A
in the previous period. The previous de¯nitions lead to two possibilities: (i) ¢¾(n) · 0
5Mathematically, the structure here is an interacting particle system. These are discussed by
Liggett(1999) and Schinazi (1999). Such systems were introduced fruitfully into game theory by Blume
(1993).
6or ¢¾(n) ¸ 0 for all n, or (ii) ¢¾(n) changes sign for some value of n. In the former
case the choices of neighbors do not a®ect the ranking of actions, whereas in the latter
case they do. We focus on case (ii)|for both signals the relative ranking of the actions
changes with n.6 Of particular interest is how rankings change with the signal. Let N
be the total number of neighbors (which is an even number for both the circle and the
torus). When n = N=2, the neighbors are equally split between playing the two actions,
so the e®ect of the two is, in some sense, neutralized. We assume:
Assumption 2: At n = N=2, the sign of ¢¾(n) changes with the signal|
speci¯cally, ¢®(N=2) > 0 and ¢¯(N=2) < 0.
This assumption captures the idea that A is the better choice when signal ® is observed,
whereas B is the better choice if signal ¯ is observed (once social in°uences are neutral-
ized). Together with the assumption 1, and the focus on case (ii), this implies that an
agent should choose A if all N neighbors do so, and B if all neighbors choose B. In other
words, \lock-in" to either action is a possibility. We assume error in decision-making.
Assumption 3: Given (¾;n), with probability (1 ¡ ") an agent chooses the
action that maximizes payo®s, and with probability " chooses the inferior
action.
Our ¯nal assumption relates to properties of signals. A region is a ¯xed, contiguous, set
of locations. Signals arrive with ¯xed probability within a region, but the probability
can di®er across regions. To simplify, we consider two regions, East and West. In the
circle, East is de¯ned as the set fiji · M=2g, in the torus by f(i;j)jj · M=2g. An
important feature of the de¯nition of regions here is that they are contiguous, and not
isolated. There are other ways to model contact between regions. For instance, a model
6For case (i), our arguments imply that the emergent behavior would be to play the action superior
for all n.
7with very similar properties to our circle model is the following|we have two circles
and, occasionally, an agent in one circle imitates a randomly selected individual from the
other circle.7
Assumption 4: The probability that a location x 2 East receives signal ® is
p, and the probability location y 2 West receives signal ® is q. In general
p 6= q.
We now illustrate the reach of this model with three applications.
We begin with a ¯nite version of the medical procedure choice problem discussed in
BFP. The decision-makers are physicians who, in each period, get a new patient with a
speci¯c condition (say, coronary atherosclerosis). Signals are now to be interpreted as
patient characteristics, e.g. age (® is `old' and ¯ is `young'). After observing patient
characteristics a physician must choose between two procedures (drugs (A) or surgery
(B)). Physicians are in°uenced by the choices made recently by their neighbors|either
because they talk to, and learn from, neighbors, or from a desire to conform with local
practice. In the manner of assumption 2, procedure A is better for ® (old) patients while
B is better for ¯ (young) patients. Patient characteristics (age distributions) can di®er
across regions (p 6= q). We want to know whether stable patterns of procedure use evolve,
and whether patients in di®erent regions are likely to receive di®erent treatments.
Our second example is of technology choice with a network externality. The decision-
makers are problem solvers who belong to one of two professional groups. There are
two available technologies (A and B) from which an individual must choose. An agent's
neighbors are people he interacts with, typically from the same profession. We index
people in such a manner that a region comprises all the people in the same profession
(the people with ties across professions are placed on the boundary). For concreteness,
the East comprises graphic designers, and West writers. At each date, each individual
7We thank Rinaldo Schinazi for this observation.
8gets a task which may be intensive in the use of images (®) or of text (¯). Image-intensive
tasks are best solved using technology A, while technology B is best for text-intensive
tasks. There is also a network externality present. You are more likely to use a technology
if your neighbors use the same technology. People in both professions get both types of
tasks, but graphic designers are more likely to get image-intensive tasks (p > q). The
questions now concern whether stable patterns of technology adoption arise, and whether
technology use di®ers across professional groups.
Our ¯nal example concerns corruption of government employees, and we assume the
geography of a circle. The agents are now o±cials, who choose to either solicit a bribe
(A) or not (B). The payo®s imply that o±cials are more likely to solicit bribes if their
neighbors do so (perhaps because this lowers the risk of getting caught, or reduces the
stigma associated with corruption). A signal is now the arrival of a private individual
with some business transaction. This person has some observable characteristic that can
take one of two values, ® or ¯, such as rich or poor, doctor or lawyer, member of one
ethnic group or another. A given individual's corruptibility, that is his willingness to
accept the bribe rather than report the o±cial, cannot be observed in advance, but it is
correlated with the observable characteristic. For example, suppose that 70% of ®'s are
corruptible (accept all bribes), but only 30% of ¯ types are. De¯ne payo®s conditional on
corruptibility with the notation ^ ¼(di;bk;n), where bk 2 fc;:cg indicates corruptibility.
Let ^ ¼(A;c;n) = n, ^ ¼(A;:c;n) = n ¡ 2, and let ^ ¼(B;bk;n) = 0 for either value of bk.
Given these payo®s and the conditional probabilities of corruptibility, the expected payo®
for an o±cial that solicits a bribe from an ® type is thus
¼(A;®;n) = 0:7n + 0:3(n ¡ 2) = n ¡ 0:6:
Similarly, the expected payo® from attempting to bribe a ¯ type is ¼(A;¯;n) = n ¡ 1:4
Assuming N = 2, it can readily be con¯rmed that assumptions 1 and 2 hold. We assume
regions di®er in their proportions of observable types, and so the rate of corruptibility
9will also di®er across the regions. Again we want to know whether the emergent pat-
terns of corruption display regional variation, as well as which circumstances lead to a
non-corrupt governance norm. Another interpretation along these lines might involve
fraudulent activity on the part of the employees of a ¯rm, where such activity requires
cooperation between agents, and the signal indicates the expected pro¯tability of the
fraud opportunity.
3 Results
We begin by considering the case where the error probability is zero (the \zero noise"
case). In the torus model, it is easy to con¯rm that possible long run outcomes (absorbing
states of the Markov chain) include the two uniform states, A at each location or B at
each location, the regional variation state, in which A is played in one region and B in
the other, as well as the \blinking cycle" depicted in Figure 1.8 \Blinking" involves a
cycle between two states|in each state, all four neighbors of a location are occupied
by people making the opposite choice; and each individual alternates between their two
choices. There are, in addition, many other possibilities|for instance a combination of
regional variation and a strip that is in the blinking pattern (e.g. as in Figure 3).
In Figure 2, we illustrate convergence, starting from a random initial condition, for
the following parameter values: M = 40, " = 0, p = 0:3, q = 0:7. In this instance,
we happen to get convergence to the regional variation state. The iteration at which
we take a snapshot appears at the top of the frame. Figure 2 isn't the only possibility.
Another simulation, starting again from a random initial condition, arrived at iteration
8All ¯gures were generated using Matlab. Each location is represented as a diamond, which will be
either red or blue depending on the choice. The background is light green. However, when adjacent
cells are of the same color, Matlab ¯lls in the background using that same color. The Matlab program
is available at www.garyfournier.com.




















































Figure 1: The \blinking" pattern.


































































































































Figure 2: Convergence in the zero noise case from a random initial con¯guration.


























Figure 3: Alternative simulation result for the zero noise case.
100 in the state in Figure 3. In fact, in an experiment with 27 simulations (of 100
iterations), the regional variation state arose 6 times, a uniform state never arose, and
the remaining outcomes were mixtures as in Figure 3. Next we introduce noise. Figure
4 demonstrates convergence, starting from a random initial state, to a state of regional
variation, letting the error probability be " = 0:05. Again, the time period at which
each snapshot was taken is labelled in the frame. For the same parameter values, in 27
consecutive simulations, the regional variation state emerged every time.
In the next simulation we reduce " to 0.01, and depict the results in Figure 5. Con-
vergence to regional variation still occurs, but it is likely to require more iterations than
it would with a higher error probability.
In Figure 6 we show that the other possible steady states of the noiseless process (uni-


































































































































Figure 4: Convergence in the noisy case from a random initial con¯guration (" = 0:05).


































































































































Figure 5: Convergence in the noisy case from a random initial con¯guration (" = 0:01).














































































Figure 6: Convergence in the noisy case starting from, respectively top to bottom, the
two uniform states and the blinking state. (" = 0:05).








































































































Figure 7: Criticality: p = 1=2 and q = 1=2 are the thresholds.
17form and blinking) are unstable, even when the error probability is very small. The simu-
lations begin, respectively, in (1) the uniform state with everyone playing A, (2) everyone
playing B, and (3) one of the blinking states. With error, the stable local norm can al-
ways get a toe-hold, and then spreads by contagion. In each case we get fairly quick
convergence to the regional variation state. Of the three, the blinking state took longest
to disappear.
Figure 7 illustrates the \criticality" phenomenon: the existence of critical parameter
thresholds that, when crossed, e®ect precipitous change in the behavior of the system.
However, on either side of the critical point variation in fundamentals is irrelevant. The
parameters that exhibit threshold e®ects in this model are p and q. In the east, the
prevailing norm depends upon whether p is greater than, or less than 1=2. We start,
in the top left hand frame of Figure 7, with the long-run outcome when p = 0:55 and
q = 0:45. Increases in p above 0:5, or decreases in q below 0:5, make virtually no
di®erence. In the top right hand frame, we reverse the parameter values (to 0.45 and
0.55 respectively). In both these graphs regional di®erences are not as sharp as they were
in Figures 4{6, but the pattern is unmistakeable. In the bottom left hand frame, we have
p = 0:3 and q = 0:7 (that is we reverse the values from the Figure 4). In the ¯nal frame,
p = q = 0:6. It is clear that the critical value determining the norm for a region is the
probability of the ® signal.
Finally we consider the circle model, highlighting just the points of contrast with
the torus. One key di®erence is that regional variation is no longer a long run steady
state of the noiseless process. The reader can readily verify that the variation state
will always eventually be supplanted by a globally uniform state, never to return. The
probability of getting to a uniform state from the regional variation state, however small,
is bounded away from zero. And once either uniform state arises it will persist forever.
Thus the long run outcome may be global uniformity, but it could also be the blinking





















Figure 8: Slow convergence: regional variation is a robust phenomenon (" = 0).
state depending on early random events. Figure 8 shows something interesting, however.
In this model we show the full evolution in one graph, and the X-axis denotes time. We
consider ¯rst the noiseless case. Despite the fact that regional variation is not a steady
state here, we see after 100 iterations that it could arise and persist for multiple time
periods. Convergence to one of the steady states is very slow, and regional variation is
a robust phenomenon. Another robust outcome is some combination of a regional norm
with the blinking pattern. The same is true for the torus model.
Finally, we start from a uniform state and introduce small noise (" = 0:05) to get
convergence to regional variation. It should be pointed out that small regions of the
blinking pattern can arise and persist for multiple periods. Therefore convergence is not
as sharp as in the simulations on the torus. The blinking pattern is, to a large extent, an
artifact of the simultaneity of decisions. We have simulated a model in which decisions
are asynchronous (at each date, only one person gets to make a choice). In that model
the blinking pattern (as well as combinations of regional variations with this pattern)





















Figure 9: Convergence to long-run outcome (" = 0:05).
does not arise.
4 Conclusion
The model tells us that alternative norms may coexist in close proximity to each other
for inde¯nite periods of time, despite a tendency toward local conformity. We focus on
situations involving a network externality, which tends to promote uniformity among
interacting agents. Conformity within a given region will be close to complete, despite
heterogeneity in payo®s. The distribution of signals determines what the local norm will
be. Consider the medical practice example, where the signal is patient type (e.g. old
or young). The majority type within a region will dictate the content of the norm, and
thus norms can di®er across regions depending on the region's type mix. When the dom-
inant type di®ers across regions, local norms respond accordingly, and we witness global
diversity as the stable phenomenon. The concept of \lock-in" has been very in°uential
20in the study of institutions and organizations, and our results in the noiseless case illus-
trate how it could arise. But small noise, as in the theory of Kandori, Mailath, and Rob
(1993), Young (1993) and Ellison (1993), allows us to re¯ne predictions considerably.
New patterns of behavior, although they arise by error, can spread contagiously until
they become locally prevalent. Lock-in does not have quite as tenacious a hold as in the
noiseless case.
The locality of interactions is crucial for our results. In such settings, global ma-
jorities need not dictate global norms. Alternative norms will survive as long as there
exist regions (or subgroups) within which the globally dominant signal or type forms a
minority, even though interactions straddle regional boundaries. As informal evidence,
we observe that minority languages are sustained by the presence of ethnic residential
enclaves. We also observe ethnically and regionally speci¯c slang and dress codes, as well
as pockets of dedicated Mac users in a Windows-dominated world. Furthermore, as our
criticality results indicate, stable coexistence does not require extreme di®erences in the
composition of the population across regions or groups. The criticality of the 50% thresh-
old also means that norms can shift rapidly within a region with even a small change
in demographics around the threshold. The results caution against making inferences
about preferences, both within and across regions, based on observed behavior. A single
norm can accommodate a diversity of types, just as relatively small changes in group
characteristics may cause a discrete shift in the dominant behavior.
The condition of regional variation, involving local uniformity and global diversity,
embeds certain social tensions. We have shown that within any region or group there
may be a large number of agents (i.e. the minority type) who would be better o® (a) liv-
ing in a di®erent region, in which their preferred norm prevails, or (b) living in the same
region but being a member of the majority type. In the signal interpretation, any given
individual will face inferior payo®s whenever she receives the locally less common signal
21type. We have treated location and characteristics as exogenous. However, if geographic
location or social network were made endogenous, we would expect self-selection into
locations or networks by type, i.e. spontaneous physical or social segregation. Alterna-
tively if locations remain ¯xed but type could be chosen, people could simply adapt their
preferences to their surroundings. Even racial identity might be viewed as endogenous,
as in Akerlof and Kranton (2000) and Bodenhorn and Ruebeck (2003).
Depending on the application under consideration, the degree to which location or
characteristics are in fact endogenous will vary, as will the welfare implications. While
the prospect of spontaneous segregation echoes Schelling (1971), in the context of our
model segregation by characteristics, i.e. the signal, may be socially preferred to an out-
come in which regions or groups have a mix of types. Luckily, the implications need not
be politically unsavory. For example, ignoring transport costs, it is desirable that med-
ical patients be transferred to the treatment location that specializes in the treatment
that best suits her type. In the case of corruption or corporate malfeasance, however,
endogeneity may have negative consequences. We might expect, for example, that ini-
tially honest types, witnessing rampant corruption or receiving frequent invitations to
embezzle, might eventually su®er moral decay. If so, replacing dishonest workers with
honest workers on a piecemeal basis would be futile. Segregation and assimilation are
not inevitable in every application, however. For example, graphics and text processing
may be complements within a ¯rm. If so the ¯rm faces a tradeo® between compatibility
across workers or tasks and supplying the best tool for each task. In our model the ben-
e¯ts of compatibility produce local uniformity, but an alternative outcome might involve
innovations which render the opposing technologies more compatible.
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